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REMOVAL, REMAND, AND

REIMBURSEMENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1447(C)
CHRISTOPHER R. MCFADDEN*

I. INTRODUCTION

We have it from the highest authority that the federal removal statutes are
to be strictly construed.' Although defendants have the right to remove cases
on the basis of diversity,2 federal question,3 or other specific statutory
grounds,4 it has been universally held that any removal attempt should be
viewed with suspicion and that the case should be remanded if there is any
doubt as to whether the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction. 5 This is
because state courts are fora of general jurisdiction empowered to hear cases
arising under either federal or state law, but federal courts are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction that may resolve civil disputes only if the plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint raises an issue of federal law or involves a matter of state
law between completely diverse parties and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. Thus, the case law encourages federal judges to remand a
case to state court-where it may always be heard-rather than risk
erroneously exercising jurisdiction and having an appellate court vacate all of
their decisions and dismiss the case several years down the road.6
*Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. A.B. Harvard University; J.D. Northwestern
University.
Thanks to Judge John L. Coffey and Judge Ira DeMent for their mentorship, to Jason M.P. Kleinberg
and Martin H. Redish for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Cary Biskupic, Mary B. Jones, D.
Alexander Martin, and Daniel K. Storino for their research assistance. This Article was substantially
completed prior to my employment with Sidley Austin; all views and any errors are my own.
1. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941). Removal, for
purposes of this Article, is the process through which a case originally filed by the plaintiff in state
court is transferred by the defendant or defendants to federal court.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2000) (controlling removal by federal officers); 28 U.S.C. §
1443 (2000) (controlling removal of civil rights cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (2000) (controlling removal
of foreclosure actions against the United States).
5. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Bus. Men's Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Jones v. Gen.
Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d at 411 ("A presumption in favor of remand is necessary
because if a federal court reaches the merits of a pending motion in a removed case where subject
matter jurisdiction may be lacking it deprives a state court of its right under the Constitution to

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[87:123

In light of the heavy burden faced by a defendant seeking to establish7
federal jurisdiction, it should come as no surprise that nearly fifteen percent
of the 30,000 cases that are removed each year8 eventually are remanded to
the local court in which they were originally filed. Bitter and complex
jurisdictional battles often arise in these cases, and judges must expend
substantial time and energy reviewing the parties' arguments and ruling on the
questions presented. As a result, the process of removal-and-remand, when
repeated thousands of times over, disrupts the orderly flow of litigation while
burdening the judiciary and imposing steep litigation costs upon the parties
themselves. 9
Congress has long recognized that disputes over subject matter
jurisdiction significantly contribute to the "torrent of litigation" flooding the
federal courts and overwhelming the judicial system.'0 In an attempt to pare
down the federal docket, Congress enacted the comprehensive Judicial
Improvements Act of 198811 ("Judicial Improvements Act"), which, among
other things, expanded the courts' authority to sanction defendants who
erroneously remove cases. 12 The pertinent part of the statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), presently contains a fee-shifting provision that allows plaintiffs to
recover their "just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
resolve controversies in its own courts."); DeBoer v. South Dakota, No. Cir. No. 93-4021, 1993 WL
603761, at *4 (D.S.D. 1993) ("The basis for this rule is 'the inexpediency, if not unfairness, of
exposing the plaintiff to the possibility that he will win a final judgment in federal court, only to have
it determined [on appeal] that the court lacked jurisdiction."' (quoting 14A WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3721 at 218 (2d ed. 1992)
(alterations in original)).
7. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity
andFederalQuestion Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 392 (1992).
8. Records compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts indicate that 30,215 cases
were removed in 2000, 30,173 in 1999, 31,158 in 1998, and 30,912 in 1997. See Memorandum from
Maurice S. Galloway, Senior Management Analyst for the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
to Mary B. Jones, Chief Librarian for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
(July 25, 2002) (on file with MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW and author) [hereinafter AOC
Memorandum].
9. See, e.g., Austwick v. Bd. of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 840, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (condemning
jurisdictional disputes as being "a drain on the resources of the state judiciary, the federal judiciary
and the parties involved" and stating that such "tactical manipulation ... cannot be condoned."); see
also infra text accompanying notes 48-76.
10. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5984
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
11. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Morris v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 985 F.2d 238, 240 (6th Cir. 1993); Grace v.
Interstate Life & Accident, Ins. Co., 916 F. Supp. 1185, 1191-92 (M.D. Ala. 1996); M.D.C.
Wallcoverings v. State Bank of Woodstock, 771 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. Ill. 1991). See also infra
text accompanying notes 24-26.
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incurred as a result of the removal" of a case that is subsequently remanded.13
In other words, by the terms of the statute as it now stands, a federal court is
empowered to shift fees each and every time that it determines it lacks
jurisdiction over a case. 4
This is significant because prior to the
amendments, such an award was forbidden unless the defendant acted in bad
faith-something that courts were reluctant to find.'5
When Congress expanded the judiciary's fee-shifting authority, it intended
to further the three related but distinct goals of: (1) discouraging removal
except in cases when federal subject matter jurisdiction clearly is present; (2)
protecting the rights of plaintiffs to choose the forum of the litigation; and (3)
compensating plaintiffs for their costs of responding to the jurisdictional
arguments raised by defendants.' 6 Yet despite the laudable goals of Congress,
many judges have disregarded the language of the statute and the intent of the
legislature by refusing to shift fees except when they deem the defendant's
removal to be "unreasonable." That is to say, courts are applying a ubiquitous
standard, which, for all practical purposes, is indistinguishable from the "bad
faith" standard that was supposedly jettisoned by the Judicial Improvements
Act. 7
Since judges are reluctant to label a party's actions "unreasonable," they
suboptimally deter erroneous removals and suboptimally reimburse aggrieved
18
parties for their costs needlessly incurred as a result of a meritless removal.
Furthermore, because the widely employed "reasonableness" standard fails to
articulate a clear rule to follow in any given case, judges often reach
inconsistent results by shifting fees in some cases but not in others that are
materially similar. Uncertainty about the governing legal principles, in turn,
effectively deprives defendants of the notice that is essential to make a
rational decision over whether to remove the case and encourages still further
litigation over the propriety of any fees that might possibly be awarded.' 9
In light of the frequency and number of cases remanded each year-as
well as the serious costs attributable to the erroneous removal of cases-it is
remarkable that no court or commentator has attempted to enunciate a

13. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
14. See, e.g., Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1999). See also infra text
accompanying notes 80-103.
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992);
Bucary v. Rothrock, 883 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 1989); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 687
(I0th Cir. 1981).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 24-44, 80-103.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 81-87, 160-81.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 77, 105-07.
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universal rule for courts to follow when determining whether to shift fees
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 20 This Article seeks to fill that doctrinal void by
replacing the arbitrary, complex "reasonableness" inquiry with a
straightforward two-part test that will dictate whether fees should be awarded.
Under the proposed test, the court should first determine whether the
defendant properly established federal subject matter jurisdiction at the time
of removal. If so, then the plaintiff's fee request should be denied. If not, the
court should proceed to award fees and costs to the plaintiff unless: (1) the
plaintiff caused the erroneous removal by misrepresenting facts that were
necessary for the defendant to make a well-informed decision to remove the
case; or (2) the plaintiff caused the case to be remanded by divesting the court
of jurisdiction after removal, often by dismissing his federal claims or joining
diversity-destroying parties from his home state. 21 Put another way, if the
defendant is responsible for the ineffective removal, then he should be forced
to bear the costs of his actions--costs that are felt not only by the plaintiff
opposing the removal but also by the entire judicial system, which suffers
from the added delays and burdens of resolving the jurisdictional issues raised
in a myriad of cases brought before the court. 22 By regularly awarding fees
against the defendant, unless the plaintiff bears the true responsibility for the
erroneous removal or makes a tactical decision to return a properly removed
case to state court, federal judges will further the intent of Congress to
discourage faulty removals, make aggrieved plaintiffs whole, and conserve
judicial resources expended on jurisdictional
issues that fail to resolve the
23
merits of the underlying case in any respect.
Part II of this Article describes how the erroneous removal of cases
contributes to the burdens faced by federal courts today, with their
overcrowded dockets and staggering caseloads. This Part also discusses those
well-established legal principles that require the narrow construction of the
removal statutes, while further analyzing the fee-shifting statute in order to
suggest that Congress intended to award fees even in situations when the
defendant acted reasonably but the case is nonetheless remanded. Part III
then sketches the proposed test for judges to follow when applying 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) and provides examples of how the test would resolve the most
common situations faced by courts today. Part IV elaborates upon why
20. See Mints v. Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Congress, however,
did not establish a standard governing when a court should require the payment of fees and
costs .... "); Marriage of Nasca v. PeopleSoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("The
courts have not established precise criteria by which to make [the fee] determination .....
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 53-76.
23. See infra Part III.A.
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various alternative tests presently relied upon by some courts when
determining whether to award fees-including the "reasonableness" test-are
flawed and should be abandoned. Part V concludes.
II. REMOVAL, JUDICIAL OVERLOAD, AND THE ISSUE OF CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT

To understand why courts should enforce the fee-shifting provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) in a manner that will discourage the erroneous removal of
cases, it is useful first to examine the pressures faced by federal judges coping
with today's oversized dockets, the extent to which the removal-and-remand
process increases those pressures, and the statute's legislative history, which
makes clear that Congress intended for the aggrieved party to recover fees and
costs incurred as a result of the removal. It also is important to review the
fundamental principles of federal jurisdiction that call for a narrow application
of removal statutes and, by implication, a presumption in favor of awarding
fees to the plaintiff.
A.

Docket Pressuresin the Modern Era

Section 1447(c) was amended by the Judicial Improvements Act and
presently states, in pertinent part, that any "order remanding [a] case may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal. ' 4 The Act, which was promulgated
largely because of Congress's belief that the administration of justice was
being jeopardized by the rising caseloads faced by many federal district
courts, contained numerous reforms designed to reduce the size of the federal
docket. In addition to expanding and rewriting the relevant fee-shifting
provisions, the statute authorized experimental court-annexed arbitration
programs, raised the amount-in-controversy requirements for diversity
jurisdiction, and gave district courts the discretion to approve the tardy joinder
of diversity-destroying parties and remand the case long after it was
removed-even if the remand means stripping the defendant of his right to a
federal forum in certain instances when the court otherwise would have
original jurisdiction. 25 These docket-clearing measures were necessary,
according to the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice, because the public interest in seeing "'just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action' was being undermined by
"delay caused by rising caseloads" and "unfair and inconsistent decision[s]
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5991-94, 600506, 6032-34.
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caused by the pressures placed26 on judges who must cope with the torrent of
litigation" in their courtrooms.
As the House subcommittee recognized, the federal judiciary's resources
are being stretched to the limit. This is particularly true in the district courts,
which shoulder the overwhelming burden of removal-based litigation as a
result of the bar on appellate review of any remand ordered pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). 27 There has been a three-fold increase in case filings since
1960, and the average caseload per trial judge has increased more than fifty
percent.28 More troubling is that the increased caseload has resulted in a still
greater workload for district judges, even after accounting for the various pretrial work handled by magistrate judges. Aside from those few types of civil
cases that may be resolved in a relatively straightforward fashion (such as
prisoner petitions, forfeiture proceedings, or appeals under the Social Security
Act), most matters reaching federal court involve the application of difficult
legal principles to a multitude of conflicting facts. 29 The ratio of cases that are
closed without some type of labor-intensive intervention by the district court
has fallen steadily over time, and today as many as eighty percent of all cases
are terminated after the trial judge has ruled on dispositive motions, conducted
pre-trial mediations, or presided over status hearings and settlement
conferences.30 Continuances are regularly requested, discovery standoffs are
increasingly presented to the court for resolution, and pre-trial motions are
increasingly filed in all but the most clear-cut cases on the docket. At the
same time, the annual number of cases that survive summary judgment and
proceed to trial has jumped from approximately 10,000 in 1960 to 17,800 in
1995, with their average length growing from 2.2 days to 3.4 days apiece.3'
Thus, by any measure, the district courts' workload is growing faster than
their raw caseload, which itself has skyrocketed and given no indication of
leveling off in the last fifteen years despite passage of the numerous
provisions designed to reduce congestion within the federal courts.32 Without
26. Id., reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5984.
27. The removal statute provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see also
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346 (1976) (discussing the bar on appellate
review of remand orders).
28. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 60-64, 40001 tbl. A.4 (1996); J. Harvie Wilkinson 111,
The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary,43
EMORYL.J. 1147, 1157 (1994).
29. See Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 1157-61.
30. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 66-67, 68-69 tbl. 3.4.
31. Id. at 66 tbl. 3.3.
32. Furthermore, despite Congress's hope that the Judicial Improvements Act would have
noticeable docket-clearing effects, the U.S. Judicial Conference remains convinced that delays in
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additional reforms, according to a U.S. Judicial Conference report, "'the
picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish.' ' 33 And, as explained
in later detail, the consequences of judicial overload already are being felt in
the form of delays, errors, and indeterminacy in the case law.34
Congress has attempted to limit the scope of federal subject matter
jurisdiction twice within the last fifteen years. The first effort was the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1988, which raised the amount-in-controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction to $50,000 and encouraged alternative
dispute resolution as a substitute to litigation.35 Then, six years later, the
Federal Courts Improvement Act raised the minimal jurisdictional stakes from
$50,000 to $75,000.36 Studies, however, seem to show that these reforms
have had little effect on the number of cases removed to federal court.
Approximately one-ninth of all cases on the federal docket, or a total of
30,000 cases, were removed in 2000, and while the number of removals has
held steady since 1997,37 it has increased nearly 50 percent since 1987-the
year prior to the initial congressional reforms-when defendants removed
21,070 cases.3 8
Diversity jurisdiction is an important means of protecting out-of-state
defendants who would suffer parochial prejudices in state court, and federal
question jurisdiction helps promote the uniform, faithful interpretation of
federal law. Removal, after all, provides defendants with an irrevocable right
to litigate in federal court when the cases fall within the court's grant of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it goes without saying that federal judges are
obligated to conscientiously resolve all those questions that are properly
before them. Yet, it is important to stress there is no rational basis for
sympathizing with a defendant who removes a case erroneously and is
ordered to return to state court for further proceedings upon remand. There is
adjudication will continue into the foreseeable future. See Victor Williams, A ConstitutionalCharge
and a Comparative Vision to Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal
Judiciary:A PreliminaryBlueprintfor Remodeling our NationalHouses of Justice and Establishing
a SeparateSystem of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 535-36 (1996).
33. Id. (quoting COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 18 (Mar. 1995)).

34. See infra text accompanying notes 53-79.
35. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5991-94, 6005-

06.
36. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, 104 P.L. 317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996).
37. See AOC Memorandum, supra note 8 (reporting on the number of removals between 1997
and 2000); STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6 (Administrative Office of the
United States Courts) (June 2001) (reporting on the number of civil cases filed between 2000 and
2001); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 9 (Administrative Office of the United States
Courts) (Mar. 2000) (reporting on the number of civil cases filed between 1999 and 2000).
38. See Miller, supra note 7, at 389.
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absolutely no societal benefit that results when a defendant persuades a
federal district judge to exercise jurisdiction over an erroneously removed
case. Either the appellate court will discover the absence of jurisdiction and
all of the prior proceedings will have been for naught,39 or if the defective
removal goes unnoticed, the plaintiff will have been deprived of the right to
choose her forum and the defendant will have undermined the principle that
state courts should be respected as the primary arbiters of state law. 40 Nor is
any appreciable benefit conferred by a district court's decision to grant a
motion to remand, for although the ruling creates a public good in the form of
a fresh legal precedent, the presumptions in favor of remand are so strong in
their own right that the result should be obvious to any reasonable litigant
even without the need for an independent judicial ruling.
Moreover, while defendants are entitled to capitalize on the advantages of
litigating in federal court,4 1 we must not forget that plaintiffs have equally
legitimate, countervailing interests in controlling where their suit will be
brought, whom they will join as a defendant, which causes of action to pursue,
and what amount of damages to seek. A time-honored principle of federal
jurisdiction is that the plaintiff, as the party claiming injury and bearing the
ultimate burden of proof, is entitled to significant deference in controlling the
forum of litigation.4 2 The deference accorded to the plaintiff as "the master of
his complaint" counsels strongly against removal and is one reason why a
removing defendant seeking to override the plaintiffs jurisdictional wishes
bears a burden that courts often describe as "heavy," "significant," or

39. See, e.g., Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating all
proceedings for want of jurisdiction and remanding with instructions to dismiss); Wellness Cmty.
Nat'l v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
40. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 138-43 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Court's consistent deference to rulings of state law rendered by state courts); Burns v. Windsor Ins.
Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing plaintiff's right to choose the forum of
litigation).
41. Defense attorneys report that they remove cases because they believe that federal courts, on
balance, are more favorable to their clients than state courts. See Miller, supra note 7, at 395-96
(presenting survey results showing that the removal decision is influenced by factors such as
variations in rules of procedure and evidence, lower reported damages awards, differences in jury
pools, preferences of the client, convenience of the attorney, superior judicial competence and
knowledge, greater judicial pretrial involvement, and desire to delay the case or increase the
opponent's litigation costs). Other commentators have similarly concluded that federal judges are
more likely than state judges to grant motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. See
POSNER, supranote 28, at 109, 178-83.
42. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 ("While a defendant does have a right, given by statute, to
remove in certain situations, plaintiff is still the master of his own claim. Defendant's right to

remove and plaintiff's right to choose his forum are not on equal footing .... " (internal citations
omitted)); Doe v. Allied-Signal Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Courts should interpret the
removal statute narrowly and presume that the plaintiff may choose his or her forum.").
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"difficult" to bear. 43 In addition, because it is inevitable that frictions and
inconsistencies will result when federal courts adjudicate claims arising under
the law of an independent sovereign state, basic principles of equity, comity,
and federalism dictate that all doubts and uncertainties about jurisdiction must
be resolved in favor of remand.44
B. The Public and PrivateHarms of Removal
Despite the tremendous obstacles to successfully removing a case,
defendants repeatedly press their luck and advance arguments that, while
perhaps novel and brought in good faith, ultimately prove meritless.4 5 For
judges who must rule on a motion to remand, the jurisdictional dispute
requires a careful review of the pleadings and evidentiary submissions in
order to determine whether there is any possibility that the operative facts
could support a non-preempted state-law claim against any in-state defendant.
In a world with finite resources, the time spent deciding whether to hear the
case necessarily comes at the expense of all the other properly filed cases on
the judge's docket. Thus, it is not surprising for exhausted jurists, after
issuing yet another detailed opinion remanding a case, to observe in an
exasperated manner that the removing party has "waste[d] the time and
resources" of the plaintiff and the court with its ill-fated attempt to invoke the
court's jurisdiction. 6 Commentators are also quick to criticize "abuses" of
the removal process, bemoaning that "either through ignorance or as a result
of improper litigation tactics," errant defendants "can cause severe disruption
in the state court where the case has been proceeding, as well as an intolerable

43. See, e.g., Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) ("heavy burden"
standard); Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1992) ("difficult" burden standard);
Couch v. Astec Indus., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1147 (D.N.M. 1999) ("significant" burden
standard). Plaintiffs alleging state law claims may defeat removal under federal question grounds
unless some of their claims have been preempted by federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (federal
question jurisdiction). Alternatively, plaintiffs may defeat removal under diversity grounds by: (1)
joining one or more resident defendants against whom there is a possibility of establishing a valid
cause of action; or (2) limiting their request for damages or failing to seek damages in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (diversity jurisdiction).
44. See, e.g., Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002);
Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11 th Cir. 2001); In re Business
Men's Assurance Co., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 109-20.
46. See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(shifting fees to deter removals that "waste the time and resources of both plaintiffs and the courts in
this circuit."); Alley v. Am. Med. Sys., No. 98-2217-KVH, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13814, at *6 (D.
Kan. 1998) ("[T]he function of this order is to hold defendants accountable for having wasted the
time and the resources of plaintiffs and the Court.").
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waste of time, money, and other resources. 47
By reserving their scorn for defendants who have been branded as acting
"unreasonably" or in "bad faith," courts and commentators have obscured a
fact that is crucial to an enlightened understanding of the remand fee-shifting
statute: The costs and harms attributable to the removal-and-remand process
accrue even if the errant defendant removed the case on the basis of
reasonable arguments with the purest of intentions. These harms, which may
be defined as the "private harms" and the "public harms" of an erroneous
removal, often reach far beyond the parties to the case. Indeed, in every
situation, it is fair to say that by the time a federal judge has reviewed the
parties' submissions, found that the removal was erroneous, and remanded the
case, the defendant's actions not only "have wrought needless litigation costs
upon the other party," but also they have "upset the sensitive principles of
federalism underlying our nation's dual court system, and frustrated judicial
economy. 48
No commentator has discussed the nature and extent of the harms
resulting from an erroneous removal, and thus, it is useful to review those
harms in some detail. To facilitate our analysis, we might consider things
from the position of a district judge whose docket includes a batch of newly
removed cases along with hundreds of other cases in which jurisdiction is
secure. The judge already is busy shepherding all of her other cases through
the litigation process when motions to remand are filed in each of the
removals. The judge sets briefing schedules, orders oral arguments, and then
returns to her other cases while awaiting the parties' responses. After the
pleadings have arrived and the motions have been argued, the judge and her
clerks block off several days in order to review the facts and consult the
relevant law, and then the court issues opinions remanding several of the
cases while exercising jurisdiction over the others. Meanwhile, new cases
have been filed, work has piled up on the judge's other cases, and the court
must now play "catch up"-until the next removal is filed, when the process
begins anew.
The most obvious costs of the removals are "private harms"-those
tangible and intangible costs imposed directly upon the plaintiff who must
argue the jurisdictional issues in the case. A plaintiff, of course, will suffer
out-of-pocket fees and other expenses opposing the defendant's actions. 49 But

47. Ellen Bloomer Mitchell, Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effect on State Court
Proceedings:A Call to Reform 28 U.S. C. § 1446, 21 ST. MARY'S L. 59, 60 (1989).
48. Gardner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
49. For a list of these costs and a discussion of the situations in which they may be recovered
by the plaintiff, see infra text accompanying notes 121-27.
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out-of-pocket expenses are only a small subset of all private harms, for "when
an action is removed from state court, the district court first must determine
whether it has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims., 50 As a result,
by the very act of removing a case, the defendant can stay any further
discovery or proceedings on the merits until the motion to remand has been
resolved. This delay, in turn, can work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff by
reducing the accuracy of the litigation process; evidence decays as documents
are misplaced and memories fade. In the extreme case, the defendant might
take advantage of the standstill by becoming judgment-proof or declaring
bankruptcy. 51 In the more routine matter, delay reduces the potential value of
the case in states where prejudgment interest is unavailable or is set at belowmarket rates.52 Thus, in every case, an erroneous removal confers some
benefit upon the defendant at the expense of the innocent plaintiff.
In addition to these considerable private harms, an erroneous removal
produces numerous "public harms"-those insidious costs that are borne by
the system as a whole rather than fully internalized by the parties. With
nearly seventy percent of removals being based on diversity jurisdiction,53 the
typical case raises the potential for imprecise adjudication as a result of a
federal court being forced to interpret dynamic matters of state law that might
very well have been resolved differently in state court.54 There also is the
potential for duplicative litigation if the state court has invested decisional
resources on the case prior to being deprived of jurisdiction, not to mention
the fact that some observers believe the act of removal "demonstrates a lack
of respect" or manifests a doubt about the competency or impartiality of state
judges.55 Thus, a large number of removals may serve as a powerful

50. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Cabalceta
v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1556-57 (11 th Cir. 1989)).
51. Miller, supra note 7, at 404.
52. See Williams, supra note 32, at 578-79 (discussing the effects of delay upon plaintiffs). Cf
POSNER, supra note 28, at 209-10 (noting that the deterrent value of the legal system is influenced by
the availability of interest).
53. See Miller, supra note 7, at 388-89. The typical removal involves a case where an in-state
individual plaintiff sues an out-of-state corporation. Id.at 391.
54. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
FederalismAfter Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (discussing applications of the Erie doctrine
in situations involving unsettled state law); Jed 1. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place:
Stare Decisis and FederalPredictionsof State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 986-98 (1996) (same).
55. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 106. Mitchell states:
Abuse of removal and the accompanying abuse of the state courts is a serious and
continuing problem. It demonstrates a lack of respect for the state court judges, a lack of
concern over wasted time and resources of both state and federal courts, and a lack of
regard for the federal legislation which creates the right to remove.
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invitation to Congress to assign more of the nation's judicial business
exclusively to the federal courts, to create causes of action that encroach upon
matters formerly left to the states, and to shift the locus of adjudication away
from state magistrates and towards unelected, unaccountable federal judges
who are unfamiliar with the nuances, customs, and mores of the populace.
"This situation," according to Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the
Fourth Circuit, "does not comport with the constitutional design" of limited
national government and a healthy division of sovereign judicial power
between state and federal courts.56
Moreover, it is arguable that the modern era's litigation explosion, of
which the removal-and-remand process has played no small part, has
contributed in several ways to the destabilization of the law. One way is by
causing delays in the federal adjudicatory process. Cases are piling up in the
federal queue, with the average time between the filing of a case and its final
resolution noticeably increasing since 1960, despite the expansion in the
number and authority of magistrate judges over the past thirty years.57
Congestion and delay dilute the law's deterrent value and induce litigants to
shift to arbitration.58 Assuming that the federal courts should serve as the
primary arbiters of federal law, it is preferable that delays occur in state court
rather than federal court, where congestion risks depriving the public of an
opportunity for federal judges to establish precedents clarifying the law and
governing future conduct in similar situations. Unfortunately, to the extent
that federal courts continue to be overburdened, the most obvious response to
delay-expanding the size of the federal bench-is likely to produce even
more litigation rather than less. This is because judges are not fungible; when
they exercise their discretion, they are almost certain to treat similarly-situated
parties differently in any number of situations. Given that disparate treatment
Id
56. Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 1165.
following statement:

Judge Wilkinson elaborated upon his views with the

The federal government was conceived as one of limited and enumerated powers' the great
residual power-that of providing for the general health, welfare, safety, and morals of the
people-was originally thought to belong to the states. Broadly put then, the federal
system exists to safeguard significant national interests and to protect fundamental civil
rights and liberties. The state court system has the equally critical role of resolving a huge
variety of disputes-criminal, traffic, domestic, juvenile, property, tort, et cetera-whose
import can fairly be said to be more local in character.
Id
57. POSNER, supra note 28, at 126 tbl. 5.1.
58. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination

Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 433-37, 446 (1999) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of
arbitration of civil rights claims).
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of cases spawns additional lawsuits as parties attempt to capitalize on the
finest of legal distinctions rendered by the ever-increasing number of judges,
it is not surprising that proposals to significantly expand the number of federal
judges have been defeated in Congress.5 9
On the other hand, experience has shown that it is equally unsound for
Congress to limit the number of judges while encouraging them to resolve
their cases more quickly through the use of devices such as the Speedy Trial
Act 60 or the so-called "six-month-pending" list. 61 Judges are processing more
cases more quickly than ever before, but they have stayed atop their dockets
primarily by delegating enormous amounts of responsibility to their clerks,
who assume important roles in drafting opinions and enjoy all but complete
autonomy resolving issues that the judge deems peripheral to the case.62 Law
clerks are excellent scholars, but they lack professional experience, maturity,
and wisdom. District court clerks, who are thrust into positions for which law
school has not prepared them, lack the confidence or decisiveness to
admirably perform tasks of case management on the trial level. Appellate
clerks, who are hesitant to effectuate any seismic shift in the legal terrain,
prepare opinions that are plagued by timidity, prolixity, and a lack of candor.
In all cases, as a general matter, inexperienced clerks are prone to miss legal
nuances or overlook parallels cutting across multiple branches of law, and so
their narrow decisions often fail to provide a useful precedent for future cases.
"This," according to Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, "will
reduce the authority of judicial decisions as63sources of legal guidance and will
increase uncertainty and with it litigation.,
59. For a sample of competing views among federal judges who have commented upon
proposals to expand the size of the federal judiciary, see POSNER, supra note 28, at 132-34; Jon 0.
Newman, RestructuringFederalJurisdiction:Proposals to Preserve the FederalJudicial System, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1989); Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, Whose FederalJudiciaryIs It Anyway?,
27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1993); Williams, supra note 32, at 614-20; Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges,
Less Justice, A.B.A. J. 70 (July 1993).
60.

18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2000).

61. 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2000). The statute requires the publication of information such as the
number of cases and motions pending on each judge's docket as well as a list of how long those cases
and motions have been pending. See id. By publicizing such information, Congress sought to
encourage judges to dispose of their cases in a more timely manner. For a discussion of the history,
legislative intent, and efficacy of the six-month-pending list, see Charles Gardner Geyth, Adverse
Publicity as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: PeriodicDisclosure Of Pending
Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511,

528-36 (1993).
62. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 139-59; Williams, supra note 32, at 592-93.
63. POSNER, supra note 28, at 149. According to Judge Posner, "The more apparent that an
opinion is the work of the law clerk, the less attention judges and lawyers will pay to the broad
holding. This will reduce the authority of judicial decisions as sources of legal guidance and will
increase uncertainty and with it litigation." Id. at 149. "The less that lawyers and especially other
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Commentators have detailed how additional judicial coping mechanisms,
other than the decision to place a heavy reliance upon law clerks, have also
tended to water down the quality of justice. Trial judges in overburdened
districts are farming out cases to visiting judges from neighboring states who,
perhaps, are less familiar with local norms, the history of the case, or the law
of the circuit.64 Meanwhile, appellate courts increasingly are disposing of
cases on the grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel while concomitantly
adopting more deferential standards of review that threaten to mask all but
obvious errors made by the trial court.6 5 At the same time, appellate judges
increasingly are limiting oral argument and refusing to rehear aberrant cases
en banc.66 In this environment, errors of all kinds-including erroneous
removals-are bound to be overlooked, legal rights and entitlements are
bound to become less certain, and "because these rules are less stable,"
citizens are bound to "refrain from enjoying the full range of their rights,
freedoms and entitlements," writes Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat of the Eleventh
Circuit.6 7

This Article, of course, should not be understood as arguing that the
removal-and-remand process is responsible for all of the public harms
discussed in this subpart. The sheer volume of meritless "strike suits" filed by
plaintiffs dwarfs the number of erroneous removals initiated by defendants,
and thus, plaintiffs contribute to the preceding harms to an even greater
degree than defendants. But this fact does not make this Article's thesis any
less compelling, for an expanded use of the removal statute's fee-shifting
provisions would in no way prevent courts from concurrently making greater
use of their authority to use statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to discourage frivolous lawsuits by
plaintiffs.
Nor does this Article suggest that commentators unanimously agree upon
the full extent of such harms. Judge Posner, for example, has concluded that
the growth in caseload "is evidence not that today's federal judges are
overworked, but that forty years ago the federal court system was operating
with enormous excess capacity." 68 Indeed, while Judge Posner confesses that
judges are delegating more responsibility to their underlings, producing
conflicting opinions, and devoting fewer resources to each case, he
judges regard judicial opinions as authentic expressions of what the judges think, the less they will
rely on judicial opinions for guidance and authority." Id. at 148.
64. See Williams, supra note 32, at 590-91.
65. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 109, 180.
66. See Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 1174.
67. Id. at 1175 (quoting Tjoflat, supra note 59, at 72-73).
68. POSNER, supra note 28, at 85-86.

2003]

FEE-SHIFTING UNDER 28 US.C. § 1447(C)

nonetheless states that he is "not convinced that there has been a net reduction
in quality since 1960, despite the formidable caseload growth of this
period., 69 Judge Posner's conclusion lacks force, however, in light of his
acknowledgment that judges "are stretched to the limit of their capacity" and
that the federal system is unlikely to "accommodate continued massive
caseload growth in the future., 70 There is no reason to expect that state court
will become a more attractive alternative to federal court in the foreseeable
future and, thus, there is every reason to credit the views of many
commentators, including the U.S. Judicial Conference, who anticipate the
steady expansion of federal dockets unless Congress intervenes. 7 ' Moreover,
because Judge Posner's argument focuses entirely on the bottom line and
disregards any consideration of the process through which decisions are
rendered, it ignores a fundamental point repeatedly stressed by the Supreme
high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the
Court: "[T]o perform its
' 72
appearance of justice.'
A courthouse is not a sausage factory where the quality of justice is
measured with references to costs of production, rates of error, and units of
output. A respected judge is expected to do more than rule on cases; she must
render decisions in the way that society deems acceptable. 73 In law, the
judicial process counts as much as the ultimate product. Commentators have
noted that our nation's legal system derives much of its legitimacy from the
fact that it aspires to foster in litigants the feeling that they have meaningfully
contributed to the judge's deliberations, even if it turns out that those efforts
have failed to persuade the decisionmaker.7 4 Put another way, according to
Professor Joseph Vining, judicial opinions "'command our respect and serious
attention because and to the extent that we hear a person speaking through
them"' who has struggled with the case and responded to the parties'
arguments in more than a cursory fashion.75 It is not difficult to suppose that
the bar and the public will become disillusioned with a legal regime that
routinely dispenses with oral argument, or issues boilerplate orders dismissing
without comment claims that may be unpersuasive but cannot be labeled

69. Id.at 172.
70. Id. at 187.
71. See Williams, supra note 32, at 535-36.
72. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14(1954)).
73. See Christopher R. McFadden, JudicialIndependence, Age-Based BFOQs, and the Perils of
MandatoryRetirement Policiesfor Appointed State Judges, 52 S.C. L. REV. 81, 99-104 (2000).
74. See id. at 102.
75. Wilkinson, supra note 28, at 1172 (quoting Joseph Vining, Justice,Bureaucracy,and Legal
Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248, 257 (1981)).
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frivolous, or openly permits twenty-five-year-old law clerks to "become
players in the decision making process, having first-line contact with
attorneys and often conducting informal conferences" while the judge is
nowhere to be seen.76 When confronted with these facts about the effects of
judicial overload, it is difficult for reasonable observers to deny that public
confidence in the judicial system is being jeopardized and that such pervasive
cynicism risks eroding the very foundations of the rule of law itself.

Yet, reason for cautious optimism remains. Federal caseload growth is
neither inevitable nor inexorable; indeed, to the extent that fee-shifting
provisions can force parties to internalize the costs of their questionable
conduct, simple economic theory predicts that a principled use of such statutes

can discourage meritless removals and thereby help reduce docket overload."
Furthermore, even if we were to question whether it is necessary to reduce
judicial dockets in order to improve the administration of justice, the fact

remains that a separate goal of Congress, upon enacting § 1447(c), was to
reimburse aggrieved plaintiffs when their right to determine the forum of the
litigation was mistakenly challenged by their opponents.78 If a plaintiff has
done nothing to cause the meritless violation of his right to litigate in state

court, there is no persuasive reason for forcing him to bear the costs of the
defendant's legally ineffective removal.

As explained in the next subpart,

Congress intended for the fee-shifting statute to be routinely applied in a way
that will protect plaintiffs against the harms of legally ineffective removals,
and judges have no authority to disregard the will of Congress by refusing to
shift fees when the defendant's actions are deemed "reasonable" by the
court.7 9

C. Legislative History

One of Congress's fundamental purposes in amending the removal
76. Williams, supra note 32, at 593.
77. By ensuring that defendants will routinely be forced to pay fees if they erroneously remove
the case, the fee-shifting device will increase the anticipated cost of seeking access to the federal
courts and decrease the demand for the same. Cf Mitchell, supra note 47, at 107 ("Statutory reform
and less leniancy [sic] by the courts in the cases of meritless removal will resolve many of the
problems" caused by such practices.). Indeed, studies regarding the use of Rule II sanctions tend to
confirm that defendants are less likely to engage in misconduct when they risk internalizing the
financial costs of their actions. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Public Policy: The Use and Impact
of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943 (1992).
78. See infra Part II.C.
79. See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 73, at 117 ("Courts have no authority to substitute their
judgment for that of the legislature."); Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional
Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1987)
("[T]he judiciary derives no logical or moral authority to invalidate the actions of the majoritarian
branches on grounds other than inconsistency with constitutional dictates.").
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statutes was to prevent cases from being removed to federal court. Congress
shortened the timeframe for removal, enhanced the potential for remand by
permitting plaintiffs to join diversity-destroying defendants long after the case
was removed, and rewrote the fee-shifting provisions. 80 The former feeshifting statute required defendants to post. a removal bond and, by its very
language, allowed only for the payment of "costs"-and then only if the judge
found that the case was "removed improvidently.'
By comparison, the
present statute provides that: "An order remanding the case may require
payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal. 82 The amendments also abolished the
removal bond and instead stressed, for the first time, that the good-faith
provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable
to removal petitions signed by defense counsel.83
All the amendments discussed in the preceding paragraph are indicative of
a congressional intent to discourage removals by insuring that "in every
removal there is [a] risk of having to pay the plaintiff's reasonableattorneys
fees." 84 First, given that the terms of Rule 11 permit sanctions for
unreasonable or bad-faith conduct, 85 the attorney-fees provision of § 1447(c)
would be redundant unless Congress intended for such language to extend the
statute's fee-shifting provisions to situations beyond those contemplated by
Rule 11. Furthermore, while Congress formerly authorized an award only if
the case "was removed improvidently"-something that was equated with
gross negligence-the amendment deleted this requirement without
conditioning payment upon any act of bad faith or unreasonableness. 86
Moreover, it is important to note that in the years prior to the amendments,
courts routinely limited their post-remand awards to costs (exclusive of fees)
for the simple reason that the statute made no mention of attorney's fees and,
in the absence of an express authorization from Congress or a finding of bad
faith, such fees are unrecoverable.87 In light of the fact that costs were
80. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
83. See supra note 81; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 6033.
84. Gray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 906 F. Supp. 628, 637 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
85. FED. R. Ctv. P. 1I(b).
86. Courts have reasoned that this linguistic change is evidence that the reasonableness of a
defendant's actions no longer is an essential element when determining whether to award fees. See,
e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Republic of Palau, 971 F.2d 917, 923 (2d Cir. 1992);
Gardner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Gray, 906 F. Supp. at
630.
87. See Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Without such authorization in the
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routinely awarded prior to the amendment and that the statute now provides
that attorney's fees are another subset form of costs, it is not surprising that
the courts from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have ruled, as a matter of legislative intent, that district
courts may award legal fees-no less than other costs-to plaintiffs whenever
a case is removed and remanded.8 8
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has reached the opposite result,
holding that fee petitions should be denied unless the defendant acted
unreasonably. 89 However, for the reasons explained below, the Fifth Circuit's
decision to create a "reasonable basis" exception to the fee-shifting statute and
the refusal of an astonishing number of district courts across the nation to
exercise their discretion to reimburse plaintiffs who obtained remand of a case
that was "reasonably" removed, 90 are fundamentally flawed.

statute, many courts followed the 'American rule,' which provides that, in the absence of a statutory
or contractual provision allotting fees, attorney fees should not be awarded unless there was
demonstrable bad faith."); see also Gardner, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 ("By enacting section 1447(c),
Congress abrogated the American Rule and allowed for some fee-shifting along with a remand.").
88. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2000); Balcorta v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000); Suder v. Blue Circle
Inc., 116 F.3d 1351, 1352-53 (10th Cir. 1997); Mints v. Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d
Cir. 1996); Morris v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 985 F.2d 238, 240 (6th Cir. 1993); Morgan, 971
F.2d at 923-24; Gardner, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60; Watson v. Charleston Hous. Auth., 83 F. Supp.
2d 709, 711 (S.D. W.Va. 2000). But cf Daleske v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 17 F.3d 321, 324 (10th Cir.
1994) ("Even after the statute was amended, 'the propriety of the defendant's removal continues to
be central in determining whether to impose fees."'(quoting Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir.
1993))).
89. See Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781 (5th Cir.
2000), as amended on reh 'g,207 F.3d 225, 225-26 (2000); Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d
290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000); Miranti, 3 F.3d at 928. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit
approvingly cited Miranti but found it unnecessary to rely upon the case in arriving at its central
holding. See Sanford v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators' Protective Union Local #224, No. 931128, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIs 33455, at *3-4 (4th Cir. 1993).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 159-62. For several examples of cases in which courts
have expressly declined to award fees because of the defendant's reasonableness, see Plute v.
Roadway Package System, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Martin v. Mentor Corp., 142
F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Moran v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 1:01-CV 1008, 2001
WL 1717214, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Boardof Trustees of Total Community Action v. Pan American
Life InsuranceCo., 112 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. La. 2000); Kientz v. Bohn Bros. Toyota, No. 00-3 101,
2000 WL 1808496 (E.D. La. 2000); Ezra v. BWIA InternationalAirways, Ltd., No. 00-CV-2504(JG),
2000 WL 1364354, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Agapov v. Negodaeva, 93 F. Supp. 2d 481, 483 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Johnston Indusustries,Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Clay v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Commercial Savings
Bank v. Commercial FederalBank, 939 F. Supp. 674, 684 (N.D. Iowa 1996). By comparison, for
cases in which courts have applied the reasonableness test and awarded fees, see Technical Rubber
Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P., No. 2:99-CV-1413, 2000 WL 782131, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(awarding fees after finding removal unreasonable); Little League Baseball, Inc., v. Welsh Publishing
Group, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 648 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (same).
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The notion that fees should be taxed only if the defendant acted
unreasonably was first expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Miranti v. Lee. 9' The
court's holding largely is based on its misinterpretation of relevant case law
and the amendment's commentary note written by Professor David D. Siegel.
Miranti began by quoting Professor Siegel's statement that:
[S]ubdivision (c) now authorizes the court to add "actual expenses,
including attorney fees" should it find that it was improperfor the
defendant to remove the case. The matter is left to the court's
discretion, to be exercised based on the nature of the removal and the
nature of the remand.92
The court then cited four cases where other appellate courts had upheld
fee awards "only after finding some fault with the defendant's tactics. 93
These cases demonstrated that Congress never "intended for routine
imposition of attorney's fees," according to the Fifth Circuit, which
concluded: "In accordance with Professor Siegel's commentary and the
jurisprudence, we hold that the propriety of the defendant's removal continues
to be central in determining whether to impose fees.",94 In other words, the
court held that Congress intended to prohibit an award of attorney's fees
reasonable grounds to believe the
whenever a defendant has "objectively
95
removal was legally proper.,
Miranti's interpretation of the statute is problematic in several respects.
Initially, it is unclear why the Fifth Circuit elected to graft a "reasonableness"
requirement upon § 1447(c) when such a standard is not evident from the text
of the statute and has not been read into any other fee-shifting provision
enacted by Congress.9 6 It also is peculiar that in its supposed effort to
effectuate Congress's intent, the court elected to rely entirely on a strained
reading of Professor Siegel's commentary but ignore all of the other pieces of
legislative history supporting the contrary view held by a majority of circuit
courts.97 In any event, even if the court's interpretation of Professor Siegel's
statement is entitled to significant weight, Miranti's textualist argument fails
91. 3 F.3d 925 (5thCir. 1993).
92. Id. at 928 (quoting Commentary on 1998 Revision by David D. Seigel following 28
U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West Supp. 1993)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000).
96. Cf Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) ("An opponent's
bad faith may strengthen the position of a party that obtained a remand, but it is not essential to an
award, any more than under the multitude of other fee-shifting statutes.").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
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on its own terms, for if the central issue is the "propriety of the defendant's
removal" it is much more logical to argue that a removal is proper only if it
succeeds in establishing federal jurisdiction-not that it is proper except when
the defendant's arguments are patently frivolous or vexatious. That is to say,
if the defendant is responsible for the removal, and he has prolonged litigation
by advancing meritless arguments and inflicting public and private harms in
the process, then the removal should be labeled improper and he should be
required to pay the plaintiffs fees and costs. 98 On the other hand, when the
the erroneous removal, then
plaintiffs inequitable conduct effectively causes
99
fees.
recovering
from
estopped
he should be
Finally, all of the cases cited by the Miranti court as precedent for its
"reasonableness" requirement are inapposite, for they either were decided
prior to the 1988 amendments or simply affirmed the district court's decision
to deny a fee award when the defendant acted reasonably in the eyes of the
district court. 100 For reasons explained throughout this Article, it is preferable
as a matter of legislative intent and sound public policy to shift fees without
regard to the reasonableness of the defendant's actions. Nevertheless, a
district court's decision to shift fees is deferentially reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, 10' which means that it must be affirmed unless the decision strikes
02
the reviewing court as "fundamentally wrong" rather than simply unwise.
There is a difference, of course, between affirming a court's refusal to shift
fees and holding that fees may never be shifted in any future case like the one
presented to the court. In other words, the mere mention by an appellate court
that a defendant's reasonableness is a sufficient basis to warrant denial of a
fee petition does not imply that the court has declared that all future awards
must be conditioned upon a finding of unreasonableness. Miranti, thus, is a
decision that is shorn of precedent and rests upon nothing more than a
foundation of quicksand.' 03
98. See Suder v. Blue Circle, Inc., 116 F.3d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1997) ("A removal is proper
only if it is legitimate."); Codner v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275 (W.D.
Okla. 2000) (noting that the issue "is not whether removal was 'colorable' but whether it is
legitimate").
99. See infra text accompanying notes 140-53.
100. Miranti v. Lee, 3 F.3d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1993). Indeed, one of the cases, Vatican Shrimp
Co. v. Solis, 820 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1987), interpreted the sanctions provisions of Rule 1I-not the
fee-shifting provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See id. at 680-8 1.
101. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the court of appeals reviews the district judge's
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See, e.g., Hofler v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 296 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2002).
102. Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1055 (7th Cir. 1997).
103. Other courts also have erroneously relied on pre-Act decisions as a basis for denying fee
requests. See, e.g., Biggerstaff v. Voice Power Telecomm., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658 (D.S.C.
2002); McLain v. Am. Int'l Recovery, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D. Miss. 1998); Girrens, Inc. v.
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In light of the distinction between fee-shifting statutes and sanctions
provisions, it seems logical to suppose that while a defendant's misconduct
strengthens the plaintiff's request for fees, such misconduct is not essential to
an award. 10 4 Serious, irreversible harms flow from erroneous removals,
regardless of whether they were reasonably undertaken. Once we accept that
all ineffective removals are improper, it follows that the Fifth Circuit's wideranging "reasonableness" inquiry should collapse into a straightforward
analysis of whether the statute's remedial purposes are served by allowing the
plaintiff to recover the money he paid as a result of the defendant's removal.
Instead of conducting an ill-defined, ubiquitous inquiry into whether the
defendant acted reasonably, the only relevant question should be whether the
plaintiff has such unclean hands that he should have to forfeit his right to
recover fees along with the remand of the case. The next Part proceeds to
articulate a straightforward two-step test for determining whether an award is
proper in any given case.
III. THE Two-STEP FEE-SHIFTING INQUIRY
A.

The Rule

Under the proposed test, the court should first determine whether the
defendant properly established federal subject matter jurisdiction at the time
of removal. If so, then the plaintiff's fee request should be denied. If not, the
court should proceed to award fees and costs to the plaintiff except when: (1)
the plaintiff caused the erroneous removal by misrepresenting facts that were
necessary for the defendant to make an informed decision to remove the case;
or (2) the plaintiff caused the case to be remanded by divesting the court of
jurisdiction after removal. 10 5 The first exception to the rule in favor of feeshifting should be applied narrowly, and the denial of a fee request should be
limited to cases in which the plaintiff has made a demonstrable
misrepresentation of jurisdictional fact. Litigation is an adversarial process,
and plaintiffs have no obligation to help defendants determine whether the
case is removable. On the other hand, fees should be denied when the
plaintiff actively misleads the defendant about the existence of original
jurisdiction or when the plaintiff takes steps to defeat federal jurisdiction after
Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1399,
104. See Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
Bennett, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (N.D. Ga.
Auction, 966 F. Supp. 385, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
1283 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
105. See infra Part III.B.

1402 (D. Kan. 1997).
211 F.3d 407, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2000); Ansley v.
1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Novastar Mortgage., Inc. v.
2001); Township of Whitehall v. Allentown Auto
Calloway v. Union Pac. R.R., 929 F. Supp. 1280,
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the case has been properly removed because a fee award would not further
any remedial or deterrent purpose in these situations. That is to say, as Part
IV.B explains in detail, a plaintiff should be barred from recovering fees if he
has invited the defendant's spurious removal or has effectively conceded that
the removal was legally supportable in the first instance.
If courts follow the proposed two-step fee-shifting rule, they will advance
the numerous public policy interests that have been identified by Congress
and discussed throughout this Article. Most significantly, the rule will
minimize docket congestion, protect the jurisdictional rights of all parties, and
deter needless litigation and meritless removals. 10 6 Rational defendants will
hesitate to remove questionable cases if they know that they will have to pay
the plaintiff's expenses, but the proposed rule should not chill any removal
that properly invokes the federal court's jurisdiction. By the same token,
plaintiffs may take added precautions against removal by choosing their
words and drafting their complaints carefully when they know that they
cannot recover expenses if they share the blame for the removal.
Furthermore, in addition to having docket-clearing effects, the rule promotes
efficiency because it can be enforced by judges without too much trouble and
it is relatively easy for parties to identify the rule and determine how to
comply with it. 10 7 Given the uniform, predictable and straightforward nature

of this Article's two-part test, defendants also will be able to accurately assess
the risk of paying fees prior to removing a case. Finally, since any fee award
will rest upon the application of neutral principles rather than the judge's
subjective sympathies in favor of one party or the other, defendants will face
an uphill battle if they resort to collateral litigation on the grounds that any
given fee award is arbitrary or unfair.' 0 8 The next subpart provides several
examples of the universality of the rule and the simplicity with which it may
be applied.

106. See Gardner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265-66 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(awarding fees in order to "deter erroneous removals" and "protect[ ] plaintiffs' right to choose their
forum"); POSNER, supra note 28, at 84, 182-84 (noting that "[c]aseload growth is not inexorable" and
arguing that cost-internalizing statutes can help reduce litigation); Mitchell, supra note 47, at 107-08
(expressing hope that expanded use of fee-shifting provisions will discourage erroneous removals).
107. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
577 (1992) (describing how clear rules minimize the parties' costs in ascertaining and complying
with the law); see also Lisa Combs Foster, Note, Section 1447(e)"s Discretionary Joinder and
Remand: Speedy Justice or Docket Clearing, 1990 DUKE L.J. 118, 123 (1990) ("Knowledge by the
parties of the factors courts consider in their exercise of section 1447(e) discretion also may help to
discourage unnecessary and disruptive procedural litigation of 'no win' arguments.").
108. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 46-48 (1985) (suggesting that mechanical application of rules
maximizes long-term utility).
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B. Application
1. Compensating Plaintiffs for Seeking Remand
Fees should be routinely shifted in situations when the defendant removes
the case and the plaintiff then persuades the district judge to remand the case
because the removal was incorrect as a matter of law. When the basis of
removal is diversity jurisdiction, many defendants have failed in their
attempts to override the plaintiff's choice of forum by advancing ill-fated
arguments with respect to fraudulent joinder,' 0 9 citizenship," 0 or the potential
damages at stake."' Other defendants have erroneously removed based on
federal question grounds either by arguing: (1) that the plaintiffs tort and
contract claims are preempted by almost every federal statute 5imaginable,6
14
3
ranging from AMPTA," 12 CTCPCA," and ERISA to FIFRA," SLUSA, 1
TCPA, 117 and beyond;" 18 or (2) that the plaintiffs case depends upon the
109. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Aventis Pasteur Labs., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212-14 (D. Ariz.
2002); Little v. Purdue Pharm., L.P., 227 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849-50 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Alderman v.
Pitney Bownes Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Deluka v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc., No. 00C7781, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6733, at *8-10 (N.D. 111.2001); Blakeney v.
Ga. Pac. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740-41 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Richka Enter. v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051-52 (E.D. Mo. 2001); Intershoe, Inc. v. Filanto S.P.A., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bromberg v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (M.D.
Ala. 1999); Couch v. Astec Indus., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D.N.M. 1999).
110. See, e.g., Agapov v. Negodaeva, 93 F. Supp. 2d 481, 482-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Price v.
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., No. 97-2825, 1998 WL 158534, at *1 (E.D. La. 1998); Silver v. Bank
Midwest, N.A., 1996 WL 328737, at *2 (D. Kan. 1996).
111. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling of Emporia, Inc. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 198 F. Supp. 2d
1280, 1285-86 (D. Kan. 2002); Bachman Co. v. MacDonald, 173 F. Supp. 2d 318, 327-28 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Matthews v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288-89 (S.D. Ala. 2000);
Wethington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. IP 00-1262-C-T10, 2000 WL 1911886 (S.D. Ind.
2000); Frederick & Warinner v. Lundgren, 962 F. Supp. 1580 (D. Kan. 1997).
112. Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(finding that Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act does not completely preempt state law
claims).
113. Kentucky v. Comcast Cable of Paducah, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 285, 289 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(finding that Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act does not completely
preempt state law claims).
114. Bd. of Trs. of Total Cmt'y Action, Inc. v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608
(E.D. La. 2000) (finding that Employee Retirement Income and Security Act did not preempt specific
claims raised in complaint); Complete Auto Sales, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 64 F. Supp. 2d
614, 616-17 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (same).
115. Hughes v. S. States Co-op, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (finding
that Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act does not completely preempt state law
claims).
116. Lazar v. Gregerson, No. C02-0652 SI, 2002 WL 535405, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding
that Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1988 does not preempt state law claims).
117. Biggerstaffv. Voice Power Telecomms., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 652, 654-55 (D.S.C. 2002)
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resolution of a substantial, disputed issue of federal law that is evident from
the face of the complaint even though it has not been explicitly pled." 9
Finally, in cases involving both federal-question and diversity jurisdiction,
cases have been remanded because defendants have botched one of the
statute's various
procedural requirements, and thus, the removal was
20
ineffective. 1
In typical cases like those cited above, the plaintiff should be reimbursed
for the costs and fees spent seeking remand and opposing the erroneous
removal.1 2 1 "When the court ultimately remands, it follows that the removing
party's improper actions, by their very nature, have wrought needless
litigation costs upon the other party, upset the sensitive principles of
federalism underlying our nation's dual court system, and frustrated judicial
economy.' 22 If the court refuses to award costs and fees, then it fails to deter
erroneous removals initiated by the
defendant and fails to protect the
123
plaintiffs right to choose his forum.
After deciding to grant a request for fees, the court must then determine
the precise amount that should be awarded. In order to restore the plaintiff to
his original position, it seems fair to allow recovery of reasonable expenses

(finding that Telephone Consumer Protection Act does not pre-empt state law claims).
118. See, e.g., Doyle v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill.,
149 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (finding that Federal Employees Health Benefits Act does not preempt state law claims); Tall

Club v. Am. Airlines, No. COO-982MJJ, 2000 WL 868524, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that Airline
Deregulation Act and Air Carrier Access Act do not preempt state law claims); Guglielmo v.
WorldCom, Inc., No. C-00-1608, 2000 WL 1507426, at *4 (D.N.H. 2000) (finding that Federal
Communications Act does not preempt state law claims).
119. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1032,
1036-38 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Roddy v. Urban League, No. IP02-413-C-H/K, 2002 WL 1398534, at *4-6
(S.D. Ind. 2002).
120. See, e.g., Codner v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (W.D. Okla.
2000); Bewley v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, No. 92-2578 FMS, 1997 WL 601426, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Dietrich v. Cooperstein, No. C94-4333 FMS, 1995 WL 59494, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
121. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling of Emporia, Inc. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 198 F. Supp. 2d
1280, 1285-86 (D. Kan. 2002); Roddy, 2002 WL 1398534, at *6; Bridgestone/Firestone, 203 F.
Supp. 2d at 1039; Dickal 770 LLC v. PRN Corp., No. 02 C3206, 2002 WL 1285813, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
2002); Dietrich, 1995 WL 59494, at *4; Bewley, 1997 WL 601426, at *2; Alaska v. Gen. Ins. Co. of
Am., 826 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Alaska 1993).
122. Gardner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
123. See id There is some risk that a district court might remand a case based on what an
appellate court later determines to have been an erroneous finding that the defendant failed to
establish jurisdiction. The remand order itself, as opposed to the ancillary order granting fees, may
not be reversed on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000). However, if the appellate court is convinced
that it was an error to remand the case, then it follows that the district court's decision to award fees
should be reversed. See, e.g., Moore v. Permanente Med. Group Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir.
1992) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). Reversing the award of
fees in such an instance is fully consistent with the two-step framework advocated in this Article.
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associated with opposing the removal, seeking remand, and pursuing fees. 124
Any lesser award would be incomplete, for it would force the plaintiff to
internalize some of the costs needlessly imposed upon him. Courts must be
careful, however, to award the plaintiff only those expenses incurred "'as a
result of the removal"' rather than those "ordinary litigation expenses that
would have been incurred had the action remained in state court. ' 25 In some
situations, the plaintiff will not notice the jurisdictional defect until long after
the case has been removed. The plaintiffs recovery should not include any
costs attributable to merits-based litigation but must be limited to those
expenses related to seeking remand, opposing removal, and pursuing a fee
award in district court and on appeal.1 26 This is because an erroneously
removed case remains on the federal docket until somebody points out that it
does not belong there, and plaintiffs who fail to recognize the lack of
jurisdiction in a timely manner contribute to the public harms of the removal.
Although defendants would, of course, be deterred from removing cases if
plaintiffs could recover all of their costs of litigating in the wrong forum, such
an award would have the undesirable effects of: (1) discouraging plaintiffs
from evaluating the merits of the removal; while (2) failing to discourage
strategic delay by plaintiffs, who might wait until the case takes an
127
unfavorable turn before raising the jurisdictional issue themselves.
2.

Compensating Plaintiffs for Opposing Remand

In normal cases, like those discussed in the preceding section, the plaintiff
will seek to return to state court and the defendant will desire to remain in
federal court. In unusual situations, however, the roles will be reversed, and
the plaintiff who originally filed in state court will wish to remain in federal
court while the removing defendant will abandon his prior position and seek
remand. In these situations, the public policy of protecting the plaintiffs'
rights to choose their forum, minimizing jurisdictional gamesmanship by
defendants, and discouraging removal whenever there is any doubt about
federal jurisdiction is best served by awarding fees to the plaintiffs even if
they unsuccessfully oppose the defendant's post-removal motion to remand.

124. See Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming award
that included expenses and attorney's fees on appeal); Gotro v. R&B Realty Group, 69 F.3d 1485,
1486 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming award that included fees for preparing bill of costs submitted to
district court). Most courts have indicated that the attorney's fees must be reasonable. See, e.g.,
Marros v. Naperville Family Physicians, Inc., No. 01 C 2297, 2002 WL 370207, at *1 (N.D. 111.
2002); Novastar Mortgage, Inc. v. Bennett, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
125. Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 111 F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
126. See Gardner, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
127. See id; Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 342, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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As noted previously, the decision to award fees turns upon whether the
removal was legally flawed in the first instance. Two cases illustrate when
fees may properly be awarded to a plaintiff who opposes a defendant's motion
to remand. In the first case, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of
Palau, 28 the Republic of Palau removed a breach-of-contract case by
asserting that it was a foreign state entitled to original jurisdiction under the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 129 which entitles sovereign
parties to litigate certain non-federal claims in federal court. The district court
denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, the case went to trial, and the plaintiff
was awarded $46 million. 130 On appeal, the Second Circuit sua sponte raised
the question of jurisdiction, noting that the Republic of Palau might not be a
state because its voters had not approved a plebiscite. During appellate
argument, Morgan Guaranty argued in favor of federal jurisdiction while the
Republic of Palau sought remand and conceded that it was not a sovereignty
as defined by the FSIA.131 The Second Circuit remanded the case but
awarded the plaintiffs $136,000 in "costs and attorneys fees relating to the
foreign state and jurisdictional issues addressed in the supplemental briefings
on appeal."' 132 In other words, while the plaintiff eventually had to return to
state court, it was reimbursed for what it spent attempting to preserve its right
to litigate in its adopted forum-the Southern District of New York.
Similarly, the defendants in Gardnerv. Allstate Indemnity Co. 133 removed
a class action from Alabama state court, asserting that the damages suffered
by each individual plaintiff could be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes in
order to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. Almost three
years later, after the district court had ruled against it on various issues,
Allstate abandoned its removal theory and now argued that the Middle
District of Alabama lacked jurisdiction because "'when multiple individuals
assert rights arising from individual insurance policies, their claims are
separate and distinct, and accordingly, may not be aggregated.""' ' 34 The
plaintiffs opposed the motion to remand and also sought to amend their
complaint either by bringing a RICO claim on behalf of the class or a claim
for infliction of emotional distress on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 35 The
128. 971 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1992).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Morgan, 971 F.2d at 919.
See id at 924.
Id. at 920.
147 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
Id. at 1262 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th Cir.

2000)).
135. See id. at 1261.
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court eventually denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend but awarded them
$31,300 in expenses "for developing legal arguments in opposition to
Allstate's motion to remand, and attempting to preserve jurisdiction after
Allstate's 1motion
to dismiss ...[and] attempting to recover fees under section
36
1447(c)."'

At first blush, it might seem inequitable to permit plaintiffs to recoup their
expenses for unsuccessfully opposing remand while penalizing defendants
who make reasonable, yet unsuccessful, attempts to remove a case. After all,
since courts must devote substantial resources to an evaluation of the
plaintiffs' failed attempt to preserve federal jurisdiction, it could be argued
that a fee award would undermine Congress's intent to use the fee-shifting
statute in order to cut down judicial workloads. Upon closer analysis,
however, it is apparent that awards like those in Gardner and Morgan are
needed to preserve a plaintiffs right to choose his forum and to prevent
defendants from improvidently removing cases in the first instance. Although
a plaintiff may initially be reluctant to litigate in federal court, he may
rationally conclude after the removal that federal and state courts are equally
favorable fora for deciding the matters. Thus, it not only is unsurprising that
the plaintiff would subsequently seek to remain in federal court by curing the
defects that existed at the time of removal, but also "[i]t is reasonably
foreseeable that a parity-minded plaintiff, who is reluctant to be whipsawed
between state and federal court, will take good faith steps to remain in federal
court by resisting a defendant's motion to remand."' 3 7 When the plaintiff
takes such steps, all of the resulting expenses attributed to the jurisdictional
issue are proximately caused by the defendant's improper removal, for the
case never would have been wrested from state court if not for the defendant's
legally flawed actions.
Courts that refuse to compensate plaintiffs for their expenses encourage
defendants to remove cases with impunity while failing to respect plaintiffs'
rights to litigate in state court unless the case properly invokes the federal
court's original jurisdiction. Indeed, in Gardner, the defendant insurance
company would have succeeded in removing the case, holding the
jurisdictional defect in reserve until litigation took an unfavorable turn, and
rendering three years of federal proceedings null and void.' 38 It is for this
reason, according to Judge DeMent, that "an aggrieved plaintiff is made
whole when she is reimbursed for the full expenses of either: (1) seeking to
remand the case; or (2) attempting in good faith to preserve federal
136. Id. at 1267.
137. Id.at 1265.
138. See id. at 1260-61.

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[87:123

jurisdiction after it has been challenged."' ' 39
3. Refusing to Compensate Plaintiffs for Seeking Remand
Notwithstanding the general presumption in favor of awarding fees, there
are two situations when plaintiffs should be estopped from recovering their
expenses despite successfully obtaining remand. The first is if the initial
removal was legally proper, but the plaintiff subsequently succeeded in
defeating federal jurisdiction by dismissing certain claims or parties and
remanding the case.140 The second is if the initial removal was legally
improper, but the plaintiff was responsible for the defendant's error. 14 1 Fee
awards in these situations would not advance the remedial or deterrent
purposes of the statute in any principled respect.
With respect to the first situation, it seems fair to refuse to award fees if
the defendant properly removed the case but the court then lost jurisdiction
because of some act by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs frequently file complaints in
state courts that assert both federal and state law claims; defendants remove
the cases, and soon afterwards the plaintiffs petition the court to remand after
seeking a voluntary dismissal of their federal claims or all of their claims
against a diversity-destroying defendant. In these situations, courts should
refuse to award fees because neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has acted
objectionably. 42 In fact, the removal-and-remand process has conferred a
valuable benefit upon both parties: The defendant has avoided potential
liability with respect to the dismissed claims while the plaintiff is permitted to
return to his preferred state forum to resolve the remaining issues of state law.
For the same reasons, judges also should decline to award fees in cases if they
first render a merits-based decision disposing of certain claims and then
remand the case after declining to exercise jurisdiction over the other
remaining claims. 143 If the court was empowered to exercise jurisdiction at
the outset, then the parties have had their day in court and any private harms
139. Id. at 1265. For an example of another case in which the application of the test set forth in
this section would have resulted in an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, see Fulham v. Allstate
Indem. Co., No. 97-123-CIV-FTM-250, 1998 WL 160852 (M.D. Fla. 1998). In Fulham, as in
Gardner, Allstate's attorneys erroneously removed a class action lawsuit and then disavowed their
removal theory nearly one year afterwards. See id at * 1-2. The plaintiff resisted the motion to
remand, but the court ultimately agreed that the amount-in-controversy requirement was not satisfied.
See id. at *4.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 144-53.
142. See, e.g., Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490-91 (9th Cir. 1995); Kuehl v.
LaFarge Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D. Mass. 2001).
143. See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490; Kunica v. St. Jean Fin. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 342, 349-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Gray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 906 F. Supp. 628, 635 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
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attributable to the removal are minimized by the fact that the plaintiffs claims
have been adjudicated and finally resolved.
On the other hand, given that any decisions rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction are null and void, 144 courts should not allow plaintiffs to benefit
from distorting or affirmatively misrepresenting the jurisdictional facts that
are necessary for the defendant to decide whether to remove the case. Any
fee award in this situation would risk encouraging plaintiffs to engage in
manipulative tactics and gamesmanship, driving up the litigation costs of their
opponents by tricking them into removing the case only to pursue remand
once the federal court acquired jurisdiction. In order to discourage such sharp
tactics, plaintiffs should be held accountable for any erroneous jurisdictional
representations made to opposing counsel and should be estopped from
recovering fees if they unambiguously assure the defendant that their case can
be litigated in federal court.
Avitts v. Amoco Production Co.' 45 and Barraclough v. ADP Automotive
Claims Services, Inc.,146 provide instructive illustrations of when it is
appropriate to deny the plaintiffs fee request on the basis of his or her
jurisdictional misrepresentations. In Avitts, the plaintiff filed a complaint in
state court that failed to identify any particular federal law which Amoco
might have violated, but instead cryptically stated "that the evidence will
reflect that the damages caused by the Defendants are in violation of not only
State law but also Federal law. ' ' 147 The defendants removed and the Fifth
Circuit ultimately remanded the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court
properly declined to tax costs, however, for Avitts's poorly drafted complaint
invited the error committed by the defendants. 48 Similarly, the plaintiff in
Barraclough filed a civil action in state court alleging violations of
California's human rights laws. 149 Though the complaint listed no federal
cause of action, Barraclough's attorney: (1) explicitly advised defense counsel
in a letter that he intended to amend the complaint to raise a claim under the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act; and (2) further propounded
interrogatories seeking an admission from the defendant that the company
144. See, e.g., Myerson v. Showboat Marina Casino P'ship, 312 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2002)
(vacating trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanding with instructions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction). See also supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
145. 53 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 1995), appeal after remand, 111 F.3d 30 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Avitts

IF').
146. 818 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
147. Avitts, 53 F.3d at 692.
148. Avitts H, Ill F.3d at 33 ("Because appellees bear a substantial share of the responsibility
for the case remaining in federal court, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding fees and costs to appellees under § 1447(c).").
149. Barraclough,818 F. Supp. at 1311.
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violated the Act. 150 The defendant, relying upon this unambiguous assurance
that the plaintiff intended to assert a federal question, removed the case.
Barraclough thereafter refused to amend her complaint and moved to remand
for lack of jurisdiction. The district judge
remanded the case but did not grant
1 51
1447(c).
§
under
fees
any
plaintiff
the
Both Avitts and Barraclough are cases in which the plaintiff clearly,
definitively, and unambiguously misrepresented the relevant jurisdictional
52
facts that were necessary to determine whether the case was removable.
These cases must be distinguished from the vast majority of occasions in
which the defendant has simply misread the complaint or tried to stretch the
boundaries of federal jurisdiction, thus failing to meet his burden of removal
through no fault of the plaintiffs. 153 While some complaints will be inartfully
drafted, it does not follow that the plaintiff should be estopped from
recovering fees. Cases do not belong in federal court if there is any doubt
about subject matter jurisdiction, and if the fee-shifting statute is to play any
role in deterring the erroneous removal of borderline cases, then fee awards
must be the norm rather than the exception.
150. See id
151. Seeid at 1312.
152. See also George v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 98-4025-RDR, 1998 WL 220206, at *2
(D. Kan. 1998) (refusing to award fees when plaintiff's amended complaint eliminated many prior
references to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but still referred to federal statute in "jurisdiction" portion of
complaint); Heichman v. AT&T, 943 F. Supp. 1212, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to award fees
when "plaintiff alleged compliance with the amount in controversy requirement without any realistic
basis in fact for doing so"); Fair v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 95-2025, 1995 WL 591323, at *2
(E.D. La. 1995) (refusing to award fees when plaintiff sought unspecified amount of damages and
then filed post-removal affidavit stipulating that she would not accept recovery in excess of
jurisdictional minimum); Griffin v. Holmes, 843 F. Supp. 81, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
153. As a general rule, a plaintiff's complaint must be liberally construed, and questions about
jurisdiction attributable to "merely inartful, ambiguous, or technically defective pleadings" should be
resolved in the plaintiffs favor. Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 460 (E.D. Cal. 1979). Some
courts have applied the fee-shifting statute consistently with the model proposed in this Article and
awarded fees when the plaintiff's jurisdiction-related averments were inartful but did not
misrepresent the facts. See McLain v. Am. Int'l Recovery, Inc., I F. Supp. 2d 628, 631 (S.D. Miss.
1998) (awarding fees when plaintiff failed to respond to request for stipulation regarding amount in
controversy); DeGruise v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 168, 169 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (awarding fees
when removal was based entirely on plaintiff's request of right-to-sue letter and vague representation
to magistrate judge that client might amend complaint to assert civil rights claim); Arnold v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Co., No. 3:96-CV-1009-D, 1997 WL 22829, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding fees
when plaintiff's ambiguous complaint could reasonably be perceived as pleading causes of action
under state law); Burrus v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No. 2:94-CV-0089 CAS, 1994 WL 904000, at *1
(E.D. Mo. 1994) (awarding fees when defendant misconstrued several allegations in complaint); cf
Total Marine Servs., Inc. v. W. Jefferson Levee Dist., No. CIV.A. 02-544, 2002 WL 826719, at *4
(E.D. La. 2002) (declining to award fees when plaintiff's statements "tend[ed] to cloud the issue" of
jurisdiction and "subsequent removal might be in order" depending on facts that develop postremand).
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4. Compensating Defendants who Obtain Remand
The preceding sections discussed whether defendants should reimburse
plaintiffs for the costs incurred as the result of an erroneous removal. The
remaining issue is whether courts should go one step further and force
plaintiffs to reimburse defendants for the costs of unsuccessfully removing a
case and attempting to litigate in federal court. Some courts have awarded
fees to the defendant upon finding that the plaintiff was responsible for the
removal, concluding that fee-shifting was necessary to discourage
jurisdictional gamesmanship. 154 The rationale for these decisions appears to
be that if the plaintiff faces a credible threat of having to pay attorney's fees,
he will: (1) take all possible care to make accurate jurisdictional
representations; and (2) be deterred from engaging in manipulative tactics,
such as recognizing the lack of jurisdiction but remaining content to litigate in
federal court until he perceives some disadvantage with the forum, at which
time he will file a motion to remand. 155 Furthermore, it seems intuitively
unfair to tax defendants but not plaintiffs when the plaintiff shares
responsibility for the erroneous removal. Thus, it could be claimed that a
two-way fee-shifting rule furthers the compensatory and deterrent purposes
envisioned by Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Upon closer review, however, it is unsound to compensate defendants for
advancing any meritless argument designed to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
A primary justification for shifting fees to plaintiffs who engage in fruitless
post-removal attempts to remain in federal court-that plaintiffs are masters
of their complaints-is unavailable to removing defendants. It seems safe to
say that the very act of filing a complaint in state court is powerful evidence
that the plaintiff desired to litigate in that forum. Courts have noted that a
defendant's right to remove a case to federal court and a plaintiffs right to
choose his forum "are not on equal footing"; 56 the societal interest in
discouraging efforts to upset the plaintiffs original choice of forum outweighs
the defendant's interest in insuring that he may exercise his removal right free
of cost. Furthermore, notwithstanding any jurisdictional representations made
by the plaintiff, the defendant always has an obligation to undertake an
independent investigation and assure himself of the propriety of the
removal. 157 A few interrogatories or some initial jurisdictional discovery
154. See Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2001);
Shrader v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 366, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Tabrizi v.
Cadence Design Sys., Inc., No. C-95-20127 RPA, 1995 WL 249342, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
155. See Brooks, 153 F. Supp. at 1302.
156. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11 th Cir. 1995).
157. Cf Myerson v. Showboat Marina Casino P'ship, 312 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2002)
(admonishing defense counsel that "all members of our bar must assist the court in enforcing the
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should relatively easily reveal facts demonstrating the absence of federal
jurisdiction despite any representations by the plaintiff to the contrary, thus
negating the need to remove.
It is important to note that the defendant bears some degree of fault in
every situation when a case is erroneously removed. Because defendants are
the only parties afforded the right to remove a case, a defendant is at least
partially responsible for every defective removal. By contrast, fees are
awarded to plaintiffs only when they bear no responsibility for the erroneous
removal. 58 Thus, it is inappropriate to subsidize the defendant for any
meritless jurisdictional sally, for even if he has detrimentally relied upon the
plaintiff's jurisdictional statements, all of his costs could have been avoided if
he had not removed the case in the first instance. A case need not be removed
simply because it appears to be removable, and there is no indication that
Congress intended for the fee-shifting provisions of § 1447(c) to be used in a
manner that will benefit defendants who are responsible, in any way, for the
erroneous removal of a case.
IV. THE FLAWS WITH ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Having set forth a two-prong test for determining whether to award fees
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Part points out the flaws with alternative tests
that have been applied by the courts in recent years. Courts have advanced
three basic tests: (1) the "reasonableness" test; (2) the "qualified immunity"
test; and (3) the "merits-of-the-removal" test. While each of these models
offer some superficial appeal, a more careful examination reveals that they all
are seriously flawed, primarily because they fail to advance any of the
legitimate public policy interests identified throughout this Article.
A.

The "Reasonableness Test"

The overriding reason why courts deny a plaintiffs request for fees is that
they find there were "reasonable" grounds for the defendant to believe the
case was removeable. 159 Courts have found the removing defendant's actions
reasonable in virtually any situation absent a showing of bad faith,
frivolousness, or the lack of any colorable basis for the removal. 160 Indeed, in
limits of federal subject-matter jurisdiction").
158. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3.
159. See supra note 89 and cases cited therein.
160. See, e.g., Hoover v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241 & n.5 (D. Kan.
2002); Cipriano v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., No. CIVA. 98-4751, 1999 WL 135111, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
1999); Thomas v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos., 3 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Clipper
Air Cargo, Inc. v. Aviation Prods. Int'l, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D.S.C. 1997); Clark v. Wey,
C.K., No. 92 CIV. 9179(MBM), 1993 WL 313043, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Bank One, Milwaukee,
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some districts, the reasonableness standard has been so watered down that it is
impossible for a plaintiff to recover fees unless subject matter jurisdiction was
"patently lacking" at the time of the removal.' 6 1 Thus, in at least one case, a
judge applying the reasonableness standard excoriated defense counsel for his
"blatant mischaracterizations" of the relevant law but nonetheless declined to
award fees because, according to the court, counsel "acted reasonably in
removing this case on the basis of the information available at the time of
removal." 6 2
There are numerous problems with the "reasonableness test," many of
which have been implicitly and explicitly discussed throughout this Article.
Initially, it is important to note that fee-shifting statutes, unlike punitive
sanctions provisions, are equitable provisions designed to return the aggrieved
party to the position he would have occupied if the opponent had respected his
legal rights in the first place. 163 No other fee-shifting statute enacted by
Congress has been construed to apply only when the losing party acts
unreasonably, and neither the text of § 1447(c) nor its legislative history
suggests that Congress intended for fee awards to turn upon the so-called
"reasonableness" of the errant defendant's removal. 64 Indeed, in analogous
situations (such as when a defendant is shown to have materially breached a
contract or encroached upon the plaintiffs property) the defendant is
obligated to compensate the plaintiff for her loss regardless of whether the
defendant offered sympathetic, but ultimately meritless, reasons for his
conduct. As a matter common sense, it is illogical to insist that a plaintiff
internalize the costs of the defendant's spurious removal even after the
plaintiff has successfully rebutted the basis for the act of removal itself. Quite
simply, neither the plaintiff, the judiciary, nor the general public should be
forced to bear the burdens heaped upon them by the defendant whose removal
was colorable yet legally ineffective.

N.A. v. Japan Life Int'l Corp., No. 90C6294, 1990 WL 251884, at *2 (N.D. 111.1990).
161. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Cong. Life Ins. Co., No. CA 00-0124-C, 2000 WL 718813, at *20
(S.D. Ala. 2000); Bromberg II v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214 (M.D. Ala. 1999);
Johnston Indus. Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
162. Johnston Industries, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
163. See Hofler v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc., 296 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A fee award
rendered under such circumstances is not punitive; it simply reimburses plaintiffs for 'wholly
unnecessary litigation costs' inflicted by the defendants."); Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211
F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) (Section 1447(c) "is not a sanctions rule; it is a fee-shifting statute,
entitling the district court to make whole the victorious party."); Novastar Mortgage., Inc. v. Bennett,
173 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("[T]he imposition of costs is not intended to punish the
defendants or enrich the plaintiff. Rather, the purpose is to compensate the plaintiff for the actual

and reasonable expenses incurred in order to obtain a remand of an improperly removed case.").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26, 80-102.
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Another flaw with the reasonableness standard, wholly apart from the
issue of congressional intent, is that it invites unpredictable or arbitrary
results. Because the test fails to generate any concrete rules to govern the
behavior of litigants, courts in different circuits often render inconsistent
decisions when presented with substantially similar fee petitions. 65 Even
more troublingly, it is not uncommon for similarly situated parties to receive
inconsistent rulings from the same judge in materially indistinguishable
cases. 166 Such widespread confusion about the governing legal principles, in
turn, effectively deprives defendants of the fair notice that is essential to
making a rational decision whether to remove the case and encourages still
further litigation over the merits of fee awards. 167 Once again, the intended
docket-clearing effects of the statute are undermined.
Another indictment of the reasonableness test lies in the utter weakness of
the leading rationale advanced by the courts applying it-namely, that when
the complaint potentially implicates complex issues of federal jurisdiction,
fees should be denied because the defendant is entitled to have those issues
resolved in federal court.' 68 This is an illogical proposition. While federal
courts should be allowed to police the boundaries of their jurisdiction, the feeshifting statute should also be given the broadest possible application in
complex cases, given that the public and private harms of the removal are the
highest in such cases. In fact, under the relevant law, the two most complex
types of removals-those involving preemption and fraudulent joinder-are
also the least likely to succeed. Well-settled law teaches that the removal
statutes must be strictly construed, 169 and at the same time, preemption
165. Compare Williams v. Raley's Superstores, Inc., No. C94-38675SC, 1995 WL 20462
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (declining to award fees when removal was barred by Rule 6 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure), with Daniel v. United Wis. Life Ins. Co., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (M.D. Ala.
2000) (awarding fees); compare also In re Rosenkranz, No. 01 CIV 635(WK)(DF), 2001 WL
406250, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to award fees when existence of federal question was not
pled by plaintiff and was interposed only as affirmative defense), with Wallace v. Wiedenbeck, 985
F. Supp. 288, 291-92 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (awarding fees).
166. Several cases, all decided by the same judge in the Middle District of Alabama, illustrate
this point. Compare Bedford v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 916 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (M.D. Ala.
1996), and Grace v. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co., 916 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(declining to award fees when defendant failed to prove fraudulent joinder), with Caldwell v. United
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A 01-D-767-N, 2001 WL 910409 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (awarding fees).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 106-07.
168. See, e.g., Rockville Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d
673, 680 n.13 (D. Md. 2002); Biggerstaff v. Voice Power Telecomms., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 652,
658 (D.S.C. 2002); Schrader v. Hamilton, 959 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Weimer v. City
of Johnstown, 931 F. Supp. 985, 993 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Mahoney v. Morton Int'l, Inc., No. 96-CV1115, 1996 WL 535423, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); DeBoer v. South Dakota, No. Civ. No. 93-4021,
1993 WL 603761, at *4 (D.S.D. 1993).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
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depends upon a "clear and manifest" showing of congressional intent,17 ° while
fraudulent joinder can occur only when there is "no possibility" of recovery
against the resident defendant. 17' No serious observer can maintain that
federal jurisdiction is clear in situations where, among other things, a
removing defendant must distinguish closely related cases, rely upon
Byzantine legislative history, argue strained inferences from the lack of
directly applicable precedent, or advance detailed public policy arguments as
the primary basis in support of his removal petition. However, by adopting a
rule that fee requests must be denied if the defendant's arguments are complex
or novel, the courts have insured that fees may not be shifted in cases of
alleged fraudulent joinder or preemption. It follows, therefore, that the courts
have effectively gutted the statute and left plaintiffs vulnerable to
jurisdictional gamesmanship in all but the most simple of cases.
Even more disturbing is that courts applying the reasonableness test today
appear to be just as reluctant to shift fees as they were prior to the enactment
of the docket-clearing Judicial Improvements Act. As noted previously, the
Act was designed to expand the judiciary's fee-shifting authority and jettison
the former rule that limited recovery to situations where the removing party
acted in "bad faith."' 72 Bad faith was difficult to prove; it was found most
often in situations where the party persisted in removing cases despite the
presence of directly applicable, well-settled law cutting against their removal
petition. 173 Nevertheless, a review of the reported cases suggests that courts
decline to shift fees in an astonishing number of cases, 174 occasionally relying
on decisions rendered prior to the Judicial Improvements Act. 75 As a result,
defendants have avoided paying fees despite showing egregious disregard of
fundamental jurisdictional principles, including instances such as where the
defendant: (1) initially claimed that it was a foreign state under the FSIA
before recognizing its own mistake; 176 (2) disregarded case law that "clearly
170. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.")).
171. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Amoco Tax Leasing IV Corp., 34 F.3d 1310,
1315 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993); B.,
Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 554 (5th Cir. 1981).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
173. See, e.g., Peltier v. Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083 (1st Cir. 1977); Smith v. Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Comm., 421 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1969).
174. See supra note 89, 159-61 and sources cited therein.
175. See, e.g., Biggerstaffv. Voice Power Telecomms., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658 (D.S.C.
2002); McLain v. Am. Int'l Recovery, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D. Miss. 1998); Girrens, Inc. v.
Simon DeBartolo Group, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1399, 1402 (D. Kan. 1997).
176. Price v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-2825, 1998 WL 158534 (E.D. La.
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illustrate[d]" the fallacy of the removal theory being advanced; 177 (3) breached
the terms of a forum selection clause mandating litigation in state court;178 or
(4) continued to remove cases even after judges in the district or in other
courts had issued orders remanding cases that pled the same causes of action
against the same defendants.179 Prior to the Judicial Improvements Act, it
may have been proper for courts to refuse to penalize defendants acting in
good faith even if their gross incompetence bordered on legal malpractice.
But unless courts intend for the current fee-shifting statute to confer no
independent source of deterrence besides that already provided by Rule 11 or
other sanctions provisions, it is difficult to see how courts could seriously
maintain that the defendant's actions in situations like those described above
are "reasonable."
A careful observer of the fee-shifting cases might very well observe that
the reasonableness standard is, in reality, a subterfuge through which certain
notions of judicial fairness are often effectuated to the plaintiffs detriment.
Judges' opinions convey an implicit yet unarticulated message that they
believe plaintiffs manipulate the system by bringing claims that cannot be
defeated on the grounds of preemption or fraudulent joinder but nonetheless
will be dismissed on the merits soon after the case returns to state court. 8 ° In
such cases, when it is likely that the tenuous claims will be dismissed soon
after the case is remanded, federal judges seem to sympathize with the
remaining defendants who will be permanently prevented from returning to
federal court, even though the case would have been removable had the
dismissal occurred prior to the removal attempt. It could be argued that the
judiciary's reluctance to tax fees might be the product of judicial
rationalization that the plaintiff has achieved a sufficient measure of victory
simply by obtaining remand and that a further award would be some type of
ill-gotten windfall.
1998) (declining to award fees despite defendant's misrepresentation of national citizenship).
177. Thomas v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos., 3 F. Supp. 2d 764, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
178. See, e.g., 909 Geary St. LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. C014374JL, 2002 WL 253946
(N.D. Cal. 2002); Greenville Elec. Util. Sys. v. N. Pac. Group, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-0758-BD, 2001
WL 804521 (N.D. Tex. 2001); McHugh v. Physicians Health Plan of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 953 F.
Supp. 296, 300 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
955 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
179. See, e.g., Colorado v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285-86 (D. Colo.
2002); Sun v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, No. C01-01553 WHA, 2001 WL 764486 (N.D. Cal.
2001); Complete Auto Sales, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 64 F. Supp. 2d 614, 616 (N.D. Tex.
1999).
180. See, e.g., Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2000); Total
Marine Servs., Inc. v. W. Jefferson Levee Dist., No. CIV.A. 02-544, 2002 WL 826719, at *3 (E.D.
La. 2002); Jamison v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 742, 747-48 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Moran v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 1:01-CV-1008, 2001 WL 1717214, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Yet, it remains unclear in these situations why a fee award is improper.
Congress has determined that the fee-shifting provisions should be interpreted
in a way that will protect the plaintiffs right to choose his forum-even if that
means the case must proceed in state court. There has never been a rule that a
defendant may disregard another defendant's citizenship or ignore certain
allegations in the plaintiffs complaint merely because there are strategic
advantages to doing so. To the extent that the difficult burden faced by
defendants seeking to establish preemption or fraudulent joinder is a direct
result of congressional edict, it is inappropriate for the judiciary to subsidize
defendants' efforts to remove cases simply because certain judges are
dissatisfied with the judgment of Congress.1 8 1 Moreover, the principle of
parity-that is, the concept that state and federal courts are equally competent
at deciding matters before them-is essential to the concepts of equity,
82
comity, and federalism that are central to our nation's dual court system.1
Defendants, of course, are entitled to remove cases by raising reasonable
arguments to support their positions with respect to fraudulent joinder,
preemption, or other issues. But it does not follow that the judiciary and the
plaintiff should have to bear the costs of the defendants' arguments when they
are rejected.
The reasonableness test fails to recognize or accommodate the
compensatory and deterrent purposes of § 1447(c). The test also fails to
discourage erroneous removals, protect the plaintiffs right to choose his
forum, or reimburse plaintiffs for their costs of responding to meritless
jurisdictional arguments raised by the defendant. The public and private
harms of thousands of legally ineffective removals will continue to accrue
each year, and the administration of justice will continue to suffer as long as
the reasonableness test is followed.
B. The "QualifiedImmunity" Test
The second test often employed by courts, which might be called the
"qualified immunity" test, can be dismissed in short order. Courts following
this model refrain from awarding fees except in situations in which the
defendant removes the case on the basis of an argument that has previously
181. See McFadden, supra note 73, at 117; Redish & Drizin, supra note 79, at 17.
182. Although scholars have debated whether the parity principle is accurate, it remains
embedded in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1825 (1992) (criticizing notions of parity but acknowledging that
"the modem Supreme Court has long premised its structuring of federal and state judicial relations on
the assumptions that state and federal courts are fungible"); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 604 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974).
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been rejected, especially by a court within that circuit, not long before the
defendant's actions.' 83 The logic supporting this test, as explained in Gray v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 184 is that "[a] removing defendant who tries
something that failed yesterday and the day before can hardly be said to have
been 'objectively reasonable' in his decision to remove," while a defendant
should be shielded from any fee award if the removal arguably was supported
case law or raised an issue of first impression in that
by then-existing
185
jurisdiction.
The Gray court defended its position by drawing an implicit parallel
between fee-shifting and the doctrine of qualified immunity, which is often
raised as an affirmative defense in cases involving lawsuits against public
officials who allegedly have violated a citizen's civil rights. Qualified
immunity protects public officials from civil liability and the threat of paying
money damages, unless their conduct: (1) was contrary to clearly established
law as interpreted by federal courts in situations closely analogous to the case
at bar; or (2) was so egregious that any reasonably competent official would
have known that it was illegal. 86 Likewise, to the extent that Gray requires
plaintiffs to establish an entitlement to fees by producing prior precedent
dictating that the defendant's removal is without merit, the court's analysis is
analogous to the qualified-immunity rule that "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law" are free from the risk of civil
penalty. 187 Such logic, as explained below, is patently flawed.
The goals of the fee-shifting statute and the defense of qualified immunity
are completely at war with each other. Qualified immunity, which is based on
the assumption that public officials will be reluctant to take almost any type of
action if the threat of paying legal damages is constantly looming overhead,
exists to give public officials the zone of comfort that is essential to the
efficient operation of government.' 88 By contrast, the threat of paying
183. See, e.g., Nienhaus v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98C3534, 1998 WL 525432, at * 2 (N.D. I11.
1998); Missouri St. Coils. & Univs. Group Ins. Consortioum, Inc. v. Bus. Men's Assurance Co., 980
F. Supp. 1333, 1335-36 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Haisch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (D.
Ariz. 1996); Wallace v. Parks Corp., Civ. A. No. 94-CV-715, 1994 WL 665422, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
1994); see also Connors v. Malik, No. Civ. A. 97-666, 1997 WL 694732, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(justifying decision to shift fees on ground that removal theory was contradicted by binding Circuit
precedent).
184. 906 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
185. Id. at635.
186. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-42 (2002); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 630
(1987).
187. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("As the qualified immunity defense has
evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.").
188. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27
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damages in cases of an erroneous removal is an essential component of the
congressional reforms effectuated as part of the Judicial Improvements Act.
With respect to removals, Congress intended for § 1447(c) to deter defendants
from erroneously removing cases, compensate aggrieved plaintiffs for the
189
harms of the removal, and protect plaintiffs' rights to choose their forum.
Thus, although Congress intended to grant immunity to public officials who
are arguably performing their duties in a lawful manner, Congress also
intended to penalize those defendants who seek jurisdictional entitlements
beyond those provided by the removal statutes. It is difficult to see how the
well-established presumption in favor of a strict construction of the removal
statutes 90 is advanced by granting defendants immunity from the risk of feeshifting in all but the most blatant of circumstances.
Moreover, the Gray court's refusal to award fees unless the defendant's
removal theory has already been rejected in a closely analogous case does
nothing to prevent abuse in the removal process. Since no two complaints are
identical and every motion to remand involves a highly fact-specific analysis
of the operative facts in light of the relevant law, it is doubtful that application
of the "qualified immunity" test will dictate a fee award except in a tiny
number of cases. Given the small number of district court opinions that are
published each year, it also is unclear whether an appreciable body of case
law would be accessible for purposes of determining whether there is "clearly
established" law counseling against removal. Thus, there is a significant risk
that courts purporting to apply the "qualified immunity" test will fail to realize
that a defendant's arguments had been previously rejected. As a result, even
aside from the fact that the rationale for the "qualified immunity" model in no
way comports with the justifications for fee-shifting under § 1447(c), the
model cannot be applied with any degree of precision or confidence.
Quite simply, the "qualified immunity" test fails to advance any legitimate
policy interests articulated by Congress. It should be abandoned in favor of
the two-part test set forth in this Article, which establishes a fair, uniform, and
predictable means for protecting the rights of plaintiffs and defendants alike.
C. The "Merits of the Removal" Test
The final test, which was advanced by the court in Gray v. New York Life
Insurance Co. 19' as an alternative to the "qualified immunity" test discussed in

(1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1982).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 24-44, 80-103.
190. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)
removal statutes are to be strictly construed).
191. 906 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ala. 1995).

(noting that
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Part IV.B, is the "merits of the removal" test. Under this test, the courts
should distinguish between arguably meritorious removals and clearly
meritless removals, awarding fees to plaintiffs in the latter cases but not the
former. According to the court, "the decision as to whether to award fees
' 92
under § 1447(c) turns primarily, if not solely, on the merit of the removal."'
The court attempted to elaborate upon this standard by stating that:
The core question must be: "Was the removal 'improvident,' in
contrast to being merely 'mistaken'; and if 'mistaken,' how badly
'mistaken' was it?" As long as there is discretion to be exercised,
Congress must have intended a distinction between removals which
can be justified as presenting a serious or close question, and/or which
are only technically defective, and those which are improvident in the
sense that they present
no credible statutory basis for jurisdiction in
1 93
the federal court.

This portion of Gray has been expressly or implicitly followed by several
courts,

M

but for the reasons explained below, it is unclear how it is

functionally different from the poorly conceived "reasonableness" test.
The primary flaw with the "merits" test is that, unlike this Article's twopart test, it fails to articulate any standard for determining when to award fees
if a case is remanded. How is a court supposed to distinguish consistently
between removals that present "a serious or close question" from those that
"present no credible statutory basis for jurisdiction?"1' 95 Most likely, the
analysis would be similar to the "reasonableness" analysis that was criticized
in Part IV.A. Or perhaps, as with the "qualified immunity" model, the court
would base its decision upon whether the defendant disregarded clearly
established law when removing the case. But at this level of analysis, there is
an intolerable potential for imprecise adjudication, because there are no real
standards for courts to follow, in the absence of clearly established law, when
they attempt to discern whether the defendant's removal theory was so
patently flawed that it was utterly meritless.196 Each judge's view of "merit"
192. Id. at 637.
193. Id. at 634.
194. For cases citing Gray as persuasive authority, see Seminole County v. Pinter Enterprises,
Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Brown v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of America,
954 F. Supp. 1582, 1585 (S.D. Ga. 1997); see also Dead Kennedys v. Biafra, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1031 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("Thus the Court finds some consideration of the merits of defendant's
decision to remove the action to federal court is required.").
195. Gray, 906 F. Supp. at 634.
196. See Linda Ross Meyer, When ReasonableMinds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1512-21
(1996); Jonathan M. Steinerman, Note, Unclearly EstablishingQualifiedImmunity: What Sources Of
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is likely to fluctuate widely, with the potential for any fee award depending
upon the judge's individual whim. Because it is unclear whether fees will be
awarded, defendants will be suboptimally deterred from removing cases and,
as this Article repeatedly has observed,197the fundamental purposes of the feeshifting statute will remain unrealized.
Another problem with the "merits" test is its implication that fees should
be taxed only if the removing defendants' actions are "improvident in the
sense that they present no credible statutory basis for jurisdiction."' 98 Such a
definition comes perilously close to stating that fees should be withheld unless
the defendant acts in bad faith-at least if we believe that the defendant's
subjective intent may be judged by the visible manifestations of his conduct.
Although the Gray court recognized that Congress intended for judges to
exercise discretion when they determine whether to award fees, it is unclear
why the court went on to suggest that only an "improvident" removal should
justify such an award. When Congress amended the fee-shifting statute, it
expressly deleted references to whether the case was "removed
improvidently"'' 99 and instead stated that "[a]n order remanding the case may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal., 200 Furthermore, as explained previously,
if the central issue is whether there was a "credible statutory basis" for the
removal, fees should be routinely awarded in view of the fact that an
ineffective removal, by definition, lacks such a basis in law. Cases may be
removed if there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction and they must be
remanded if there is not. Any attempt to distinguish between legally flawed
removals that are "credible" or "incredible" is an exercise in futility.
Indeed, a close review of the Gray court's attempt to give some content to
its "merits" test serves only to underscore the test's arbitrariness. The court
listed several examples of situations in which it would refrain from awarding
fees, including situations in which the defendant: (1) erroneously argues that a
co-defendant was fraudulently joined; (2) exercises due diligence but
nevertheless fails to remove the case within the thirty-day limit prescribed by
the statute; and (3) erroneously asserts but fails to prove that he is a resident

Authority May Be Used To Determine Whether The Law Is "Clearly Established" In The Third
Circuit?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1247-48 (2002); Charles R. Wilson, "Location, Location,
Location ": Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
445, 447-48 (2000).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 105-08.
198. Gray, 906 F. Supp. at 634.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1998).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
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20
of a different state from that which has been alleged by the plaintiff. '
According to the court, none of these situations would "trigger § 1447(c)
liability for attorneys [sic] fees because this court could readily find the odds
of a good removal sufficient to justify the attempt. 20 2
It is possible, however, to argue that the defendant's conduct was utterly
unreasonable in each of the situations listed above. The exceeding difficulty
of establishing jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder, for example, is
well known, 2 03 and thus, it is fair to say that it is unreasonable to remove a
case whenever there is conceivable doubt about the joinder's validity. It is
also fair to assess fees against any defendant who seeks to establish federal
2 4
jurisdiction on the basis of spurious claims about his own state of residence. 0
Moreover, many courts have awarded fees in cases where the defendant failed
to comply with the removal statute's procedural requirements, recognizing
that tardiness is not an appropriate excuse for inflicting costs upon an innocent
plaintiff.20 5 Furthermore, it is by no means clear why a court should deny
plaintiffs the ability to recover fees in any number of situations when they
successfully oppose a remand. Irrespective of whether a defendant believes it
has solid grounds for removing a case, the fact remains that that the public
and private harms of the erroneous removal accrue and are borne by the
judiciary and the opposing party whenever a removal is legally ineffective.
In the final analysis, the "merits" test is really not a test at all; it is simply
a vehicle for effectuating the preferences of individual judges in certain cases
brought before them.
Unlike this Article's two-part test, which
accommodates the bedrock principles of federal jurisdiction and the will of
Congress in a uniform manner, the "merits" test is an equally flawed yet less
complete version of the "reasonableness" test that has been embraced by only
one federal appellate court. Too much is at stake for courts to continue
tinkering with the "merits" test, which, like the "reasonableness" and
"qualified immunity" tests, is structurally flawed and ill-tailored to serve any
legitimate societal interest. Only by rejecting such tests and embracing the
two-part test articulated in this Article can courts hope to deter erroneous

201. Gray, 906 F. Supp. at 635-36.
202. Id. at 635.
203. See Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d
1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997); Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992).
204. But cf Price v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-2825, 1998 WL 158534 (E.D.
La. 1998) (declining to award fees despite defendant's misrepresentation of national citizenship);
Silver v. Bank Midwest, N.A., Civ. A. No. 95-2579-EEO, 1996 WL 328737 (D. Kan. 1996)
(declining to award fees when defendant misrepresented state citizenship); Confed Admin. Servs.,
Inc. v. United Health Care Org., No. 95 Civ. 4985(SAS), 1995 WL 608254, at *I (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(declining to award fees when defendant's typographical error undercut removal theory).
205. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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removals, compensate aggrieved plaintiffs, protect the rights of plaintiffs to
choose the forum of the litigation, and conserve the resources of the judges
who are embroiled in the removal-and-remand process every day.
V. CONCLUSION

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), contains a fee-shifting
provision which states, in pertinent part, that any "order remanding [a] case
may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred as a result of the removal." The statute was amended largely
because of Congress's belief that the administration of justice was being
jeopardized by the rising caseloads faced by many federal district courts.
Legally flawed removals play no small part in today's caseload crisis:
Approximately fifteen percent of the 30,000 cases removed to federal court
annually are remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and these
ineffective removals result in delays and inefficiencies in the administration of
justice while further imposing steep costs upon the opposing party and
creating needless friction between the federal and state courts.
This Article has proposed that judges, upon remanding a case, should
proceed to award attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff unless: (1) the
plaintiff caused the erroneous removal by misrepresenting facts that were
necessary for the defendant to make an informed decision to remove the case;
or (2) the plaintiff caused the case to be remanded by divesting the court of
jurisdiction after the removal. By routinely shifting fees when a case is
remanded, courts can deter erroneous removals, protect the rights of plaintiffs
to choose the forum of the litigation, and compensate aggrieved plaintiffs for
their costs of responding to the defendant's jurisdictional arguments. Because
this Article's test advances numerous public policy interests and furthers the
will of Congress in enacting the statute, this test should be adopted to the
exclusion of alternative standards that have been developed over the past
several years.
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